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The tenth year anniversary of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) provides an opportune moment to reflect on its true 
devastation on national industries. While many economists regard it as a global watershed, Indonesia was among the 
isolated few that emerged relatively unscathed. However it would be erroneous to assume that all of its economic 
sectors enjoyed the same fortune. A study was conducted to determine the most significant economic event for 
Indonesia’s public listed housing developers in the years leading up to, and after the GFC. Panel data regression 
analysis was conducted on the financial data of the sampled companies. The analysis shows that the GFC of 2008 
was not the most significant event for the study period for housing market players, nor was it the previous year when 
housing investor confidence was shaken. Instead that accolade goes to the event of 2012.  While public-listed non-
financial companies were affected by the Eurozone Crisis that year, a combination of factors resulted in public-listed 
housing developers enjoying record financial performance. The study underscores the importance of conducting deep 
sectoral analysis before arriving at any conclusions regarding the impact of external shocks on particular economic 
sectors.   
  




A decade ago, on 15th September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. For many analysts, 
that event marked the official beginning of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) which rocked the 
world’s economy to its foundation. The GFC has its roots in the United States’ investors’ loss of 
confidence in value of the sub-prime mortgages.  The crisis rapidly reverberated around the 
world when stock prices in many countries plunged dramatically. Overall, Asian economies were 
not spared from the contagion. It was transmitted to Asian economies indirectly through the 
collapse in global demand and world trade (Lin and Treichel, 2012). Indonesia however stands 
out as the few Asian countries which weathered the GFC relatively unscathed because of a 
combination of factors including relatively small export share to GDP, appropriate policy 
responses by its government and central bank, and a pinch of good luck (Tambunan, 2010; Basri 
and Rahardja, 2010). 
Even though the resilience of 16th largest economy in world (World Bank 2017) to the GFC is 
well documented, little is known about its impact on Indonesia’s primary housing sector. The 
housing market of any country is usually influenced by unique housing market conditions apart 





from macroeconomic shocks (Kim, 2008). And so, whatever that unfolds at the national level may 
not mirror at the primary housing sector level. Despite the GFC’s strong links to the real estate, 
only a few scholars have focused on it when investigating the contagion (Milunovich and Truck, 
2013).  It is in response to this observation that this study was conducted.  
The study sought to determine whether the GFC was the most significant event for 
Indonesia’s primary housing market during an eight year period which straddled the GFC (i.e. 
2004-2012). If it was, what other forces interplayed with the GFC to make it so? And if it was not, 
what was and why? Public listed housing developers were used as the proxy for the sector. There 
have been isolated studies that have looked at the impact of the GFC on national housing markets 
(Forrest and Yip, 2011; Murphy, 2011; Whitehead and Williams, 2011).  This article adopted a 
different approach by taking a longer time horizon and providing more in-depth analysis on the 
macro-economic forces that played out over that period. 
  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section described the Indonesian economy leading up to, and following, the GFC. It also 
details the confluence of factors that attenuated the mega-shock. 
Up until September 2008, the Indonesian economy still withstood the GFC which was already 
full-blown in the U.S. (Titiheruw et al., 2009). However, by the fourth quarter of 2008, the GFC 
began to exert on the Indonesian economy at an unprecedented rate (BI, 2009). Weakening 
exports, pressure on the balance of payments and turmoil on the money market bore down on 
economic growth. On the external side, deficit accumulated and the exchange rate underwent 
significant depreciation. Still, the Indonesian economy was able to chart 6.0% growth in 2008, 
fueled by private consumption and exports. Domestic demand made up roughly two-thirds of 
the economy, which partially helped cushion Indonesia from the full wrath of the GFC. The 
economy continued on a downward trend the following year due to deep contraction in exports 
of goods and services (BI, 2010). By the end of 2009, the government implemented monetary and 
fiscal stimulus to combat the contagion. Economic growth was 4.6% that year, the third highest 
in the world after China and India. According to Wilczyńsk (2011) Indonesia was able to maintain 
high growth rate in 2009, while Thailand and Malaysia fell into recession because it had 
implemented a managed floating regime in 2009. By 2010, the Indonesian economy had recovered 
from the GFC as attested by the economic growth of 6.2%, thanks to expansion in investment and 
exports (BI, 2011). Increased export performance was pronounced in the tradable sector, 
particularly the manufacturing industry, but also non-tradable sectors, primarily transport and 
communications, trading, hotels and restaurant. 
Among its ASEAN neighbours, Indonesia suffered the least from the GFC. Thee (2012) offers 
four reasons why this was so. Firstly, Indonesia had a relatively low share of manufactures in its 
total exports. Its share of primary exports in its total merchandise exports was the highest 
compared to its neighbours of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Secondly, it had relatively 
low share of inter-regional trade in total trade, partly because of its ambiguous attitude towards 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Thirdly, its dependence export-led growth was relatively low. 
And finally, it was not largely exposed (in relation to its GDP) to banks in the US, EU and Japan, 
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and had refrained from large credit exposures to sub-prime loans and securities in the US. The 
Asian Development Bank (2010) offer additional explanations:  
 
1)  risk aversion was muted by steady policy responses and the stabilising impact of co-
ordinated global counter-measures on global financial markets;  
2)  fall in commodity prices was mitigated by preceding years’ record high prices for these same 
commodities, allowing rural households to build up a savings buffer to help them smoothen 
out consumption spending;  
3)  GFC was of relatively short duration, and therefore the lagged effects of the financial crisis 
were absent;  
4)  government’s good housekeeping of previous years provided it with the space to take 
swifter and more effective policy responses than in previous episodes of external shocks; and  
5)  balance sheets of the banking, corporate, and household sectors were much stronger than 
compared to the Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
Echoing Asian Development Bank, the OECD (2012) mention that successful policy 
management and substantial reforms undertaken since the Asian Financial Crisis led to economic 
stability, notably the adoption of an inflation target and rules-based prudent fiscal framework. It 
also acknowledges that lower reliance on international trade than its regional peers also helped 
insulate the country from the global trade collapse. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
A total of 53 companies were listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange, IDX, under the ‘Property’ 
sector during the study period. They had to fulfill the following criteria throughout the study 
period to qualify for the study: (a) listed in the local stock exchange, (b) no significant changes 
(e.g. mergers and acquisitions, disruption to financial year, suspension to trading status, etc.), and 
(c) revenue from property activities must be at least 50% of total. Only 18 companies made up the 
eventual sample. 
All their financial results were extracted from annual reports and entered into Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. Aggregated figures were computed for total revenue, total profit, total assets, total 
liabilities and total equity. Five financial ratios were used to analyse the financial performance of 
the companies, namely profitability ratios, liquidity ratios, solvency ratios, efficiency ratios and 
market ratios. Because of size variation, a weight was applied to each ratio based on the annual 
revenue of the respective companies.  
For panel data regression analysis, the statistical package E-Views 7. As 18 companies were 
observed for 9 years, 162 observations were made. The econometric model was developed which 
stated that net profit margin (denoted as Profit), return of average asset (ROAA) and return on 
average equity (ROAE) were dependent on debt ratio (denoted as Leverage), market 
capitalisation (denoted as Size) and market-to-book value (denoted as Growth): 
 
𝑌(𝑃, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐸)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 






𝑖 = 1,2, … ,18 (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦) 
𝑡 = 1,2, … ,9(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) 
𝜇𝑖𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 
All market capitalisation values were converted to log value to standardised the data. The 
correlations between these 6 financial variables were examined by SPSS PASW (Predictive 
Analytics SoftWare). Of the three types of models - Pooled OLS Model, Fixed Effects Model and 




Figure 1. GDP and real estate GDP growth (at 2000 price) 
Source: Bank Indonesia 
 
 
Indonesia experienced four dips in real estate GDP growth during the study period (see 
Figure 1) - a slight dip in 2005, another in 2007, sharp drop in 2009 and again a slight dip in 2012. 
Thus, 3 year-pairs were attempted; 2005 and 2007, 2007 and 2009 as well as 2007 and 2012. The 
purpose of these three year-pairs was to determine the most appropriate couple of dips to be 
analysed. The most significant year-pair was found to be 2007 (proxied by D1 dummy) and 2012 
(proxied by D1 dummy).  
Secondary sources of materials including reports from Bank Indonesia and international 
bodies as well as scholastic manuscripts were relied on to contextualise the financial analysis. The 
results were validated by a Singaporean real estate corporate figure with experience in Indonesia, 
and three university professors attached with two Indonesian universities. Indonesia’s 
association of real estate - Reatestate Indonesia - ignored our invitation to participate in the 
research. 
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4. Findings and discussions 
 
The financial data and ratios of the sampled companies are shown in Table 1. Before presenting 
the results of the panel data regression analysis, the figures are briefly explained. 
 
Table 1: Summary of financial data and ratios for the sampled companies (2004-2012) (monetary values in 
Rp billion) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total revenue (TR) 6,376   8,479   8,671   10,387   10,901   10,973   14,676   20,180   28,989  
Profit before tax (PBT) 519  1,753  2,193  2,247  2,310  2,363  3,833  5,171  7,608  
Net profit (NP) 398  1,803  1,983  1,368  1,307  1,548  2,861  4,002  6,952  
Total non-current assets 
(TNCA) 
23,308  20,350  21,592  27,915  33,189  40,873  49,162  57,827  65,786  
Total current assets (TCA) 11,818  17,736  20,707  25,453  28,517  27,934  38,003  46,871  60,978  
Total assets (TA) 35,126  38,086  42,299  53,368  61,707  68,807  87,165  104,699  126,763  
Total current liabilities 
(TCL) 
8,934  10,887  7,872  7,941  10,294  11,191  16,515  23,923  30,747  
Total non-current liabilities  
(TNCL) 
17,459  12,161  13,619  15,361  16,454  19,880  18,893  20,633  27,464  
Total liabilities (TL) 26,393  23,048  21,490  23,302  26,749  31,071  35,408  44,555  58,211  
Net assets (NA) 8,733  15,038  20,809  30,066  34,958  37,736  51,397  59,698  68,552  
Total equity (TE) 8,725  15,030  20,801  30,059  34,952  37,731  51,726  60,144  68,551  
Market capitalisation (MC) 10,143  9,447  15,258  53,118  25,234  33,961  53,736  65,087  100,061  
          
Profitability ratios          
Net profit margin= (NP/ 
TR) 
(0.21)  0.08  0.21  0.14  0.10  0.12  0.19  0.19  0.30  
Return on average 
assets=(NP/Average NA) 
0.02  0.04  0.06  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.08  
Return on average 
equity=(NP/Average TE) 
(0.01)  0.04  0.08  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.08  0.08  0.17  
          
Efficiency ratios          
Sales to assets 
ratio=(TR/Average TA) 
0.18  0.23  0.27  0.20  0.20  0.18  0.25  0.22  0.27  
          
Liquidity ratios          
Current ratio=(TCA/TCL) 3.31  3.94  7.21  4.41  5.67  5.76  7.37  4.82  5.09  
Quick ratio=(TTCA-
Inventory/TCL) 
0.90  1.17  1.79  1.97  2.48  2.46  3.35  2.22  2.56  
          
Leverage ratios          
Debt ratio=(TL/TE) 0.52  0.46  0.44  0.37  0.50  0.43  0.42  0.42  0.48  
Debt to equity=(TL/TE) -0.05  0.72  2.74  0.78  1.18  0.95  0.86  0.90  1.05  
          
Market ratio          
Earnings per share 13.84  47.66  48.44  18.80  17.65  19.36  32.84  41.82  72.56  
Price-earnings ratio (0.94)  (0.38)  22.62  59.07  (11.40)  34.07  20.63  19.08  20.55  
 
 





The aggregated total revenue of the sample companies grew slowly before making 
tremendous growth in 2010 and thereafter as the Indonesian economy made a full recovery. Profit 
before tax and net profit mirrored the same trend. The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 
for total revenue, profit before tax and net profit from 2004 to 2012 were 18.3%, 34.8% and 37.4% 
respectively. Total assets also enjoyed tremendous growth in the last three years of the study 
period. Interestingly total assets also spiked in 2007. The CAGR for total assets was 15.3%, which 
was less than for total revenue, implying that the companies utilised well the assets to generate 
income. Total liabilities reduced initially and then increased by larger amount from 2007 
onwards. The CAGR for total liabilities was 9.2% which was lower for total assets, indicating that 
the companies possessed adequate resources to fulfill their debt obligations, which was  a positive 
sign. Net assets recorded a healthy growth with CAGR of 25.7%, which was nearly triple the 
CAGR of total liabilities. This implies that the companies were successful in managing debts and 
obligations. Market capitalisation spiked in 2007 and crashed during the 2008 global financial 
meltdown. But it rebounded with vigour thereafter. 
All three profitability ratios were on an uptrend but recorded negative growths in 2007 and 
2008, though interestingly the worse year was the former. The best year for all three was 2012. 
Sales to assets ratio fluctuated but slipped downwards the most in 2007 and rebound vigorously 
in 2010. Liquidity ratio measures the ability to pay off short-term debts obligations. The greater 
ratio, the better the safety margin to cover short run debts. The sampled companies tried to keep 
the ratios in an uptrend but suffered setbacks in 2007 and 2011. Leverage ratios measure the 
company’s abilities to meet its obligations. The greater the ratio, the higher is the risk exposure. 
Debt ratios were fairly stable throughout the study period, except in 2006 when debt-to-equity 
ratio recorded an upsurge. Notwithstanding this anomaly, the leverage ratios were in a healthy 
range and the companies were exposed to low financial risk. And the reason why the leverage 
ratios are as such is that several sampled companies converted their debt to equity at various 
times. As for market ratios, earnings per share decreased dramatically in 2007 and exponentially 
recovered by 2012. Price per earnings ratio spiked in 2007 and crashed in 2008.  
From the financial analysis above, it is difficult to decipher which year was the most 
significant for the sample companies. Hence the need for panel regression analysis. As mentioned 
in the previous section, it was identified that 2007 and 2012 were the best paired years for panel 
regression analysis. It is intriguing that 2008, the year the GFC was full-blown, did not appear. 
The initial model for net profit margin generated from E-Views 7 suffered from normality and 
autocorrelation problems. Log transformation of data was done to all independent and 
dependent variables (excluding dummies and size variable since they were already in log form). 
This transformation was necessary to solve the problem with linearity. The transformed model 
of profit is shown in Table 2.  It shows that net profit margin was influenced by debt ratio, market-
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Table 2: Transformed model of net profit margin 
Dependent Variable: LNPROFIT   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Sample: 2004 2012   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 18   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 162  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.568358 0.083884 6.775512 0.0000 
LNLEVERAGE 0.036613 0.013073 2.800697 0.0057 
LNGROWTH 0.103930 0.042947 2.419939 0.0167 
D2 0.071732 0.033511 2.140517 0.0338 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 0.029340 0.0464 
Idiosyncratic random 0.133077 0.9536 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.105108    Mean dependent var 0.616027 
Adjusted R-squared 0.088117    S.D. dependent var 0.144211 
S.E. of regression 0.137711    Sum squared resid 2.996361 
F-statistic 6.185894    Durbin-Watson stat 1.542840 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000532    
     
     
 
Durbin-Watson statistic, d was applied to detect the autocorrelation in the model. From Table 
2, 𝑑 was 1.542840 with N = 162 and k = 3. At 5% level of significance, the value of lower value, 𝑑𝐿 
= 1.704 and upper value, 𝑑𝑈 = 1.780 were obtained from the DW Statistic Table. The DW value, d 
was smaller than 𝑑𝐿, thus the null hypothesis which stated “no autocorrelation” was rejected.  The 
error terms are not independent from observation to observation. According to Croux et al. (2003), 
the standard error of a model is robust if it is still consistent though the regression errors are 
autocorrelated/or heteroskedastic. The standard error of regression (SE) for LNPROFIT, 
LNLEVERAGE, LNGROWTH and D2 was small (0.1377), thus indicating reliability. As the 
reliability increased, the SE decreased. The equation of the transformed model for net profit 
margin (denoted by profit) was: 
 





𝑳𝑵𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟔𝟖𝟒 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑𝟔𝟔𝑳𝑵𝑳𝑬𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑮𝑬 + 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎𝟑𝟗𝑳𝑵𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟕𝟏𝟕𝑫𝟐 
 
The equation shows that net profit margin was positively influenced by debt ratio (denoted 
by Leverage), market-to-book value (denoted by Growth) and the event in 2012. Whenever there 
was an increase of 1 unit of debt ratio and market to book value respectively in the presence of 
the event of 2012, aggregated net profit margin of 18 companies was 1.90. 
The initial model for return on average asset (ROAA) generated from E-Views 7 also suffered 
from normality and autocorrelation problems. Likewise, log transformation of data was done to 
all independent and dependent variables, except dummies and size variable.The initial model 
also showed that only Growth and D2 were significant at α=0.05 towards ROAA. Thus, Leverage, 
Size and D1 were omitted from the transformed model of ROAA which is shown in Table 3. It 
shows that ROAA was influenced by market-to-book value and the event of 2012. 
 
                                               Table 3: Transformed model of ROAA 
Dependent Variable: LNROAA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Sample: 2004 2012   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 18   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 162  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.032308 0.025693 -1.257448 0.2104 
LNGROWTH 0.032808 0.013060 2.512105 0.0130 
D2 0.035032 0.009920 3.531237 0.0005 
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.022847 0.2517 
Idiosyncratic random 0.039392 0.7483 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.117758    Mean dependent var 0.017185 
Adjusted R-squared 0.106660    S.D. dependent var 0.041685 
S.E. of regression 0.039399    Sum squared resid 0.246818 
F-statistic 10.61129    Durbin-Watson stat 1.456811 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000047    
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Durbin-Watson statistic, d was applied to detect the autocorrelation in the model. From Table 
3, 𝑑 was 1.456811 with N = 162 and k = 2. At 5% level of significance, the value of lower value, 
𝑑𝐿 = 1.716 and upper value, 𝑑𝑈 = 1.767 were obtained from the DW Statistic Table. The DW 
value, d was smaller than 𝑑𝐿, thus the null hypothesis which stated “no autocorrelation” was 
rejected.  The error terms are not independent from observation to observation. According to 
Croux (2003), the standard error of a model is robust if it is still consistent though the regression 
errors are autocorrelated/or heteroskedastic. The standard error of regression (SE) for LNROAA, 
LNGROWTH and D2 were small (0.0394), thus indicating reliability. As the reliability increases, 
the SE decreases. The equation of the transformed model for ROAA was: 
𝐿𝑁𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴 = −0.0323 + 0.0328𝐿𝑁𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 0.0350𝐷2 
 
The equation shows that ROAA was positively influenced by market-to-book value (denoted 
by Growth) and the event in 2012. When there was an increase of 1 unit of market to book value 
and in the presence of the event of 2012, the aggregated ROAA of the 18 companies was 1.00. 
From the initial model for return on average equity (ROAE) generated from E-Views 7, it was 
observed that only market capitalisation and market-to-book value  were significant at α=0.05 
towards ROAE. However it too suffered from normality and autocorrelation problems. The 
transformed model of ROAE is shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Transformed model of ROAE 
Dependent Variable: ROAE   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Sample: 2004 2012   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 18   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 162  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.698003 0.270630 -2.579183 0.0108 
SIZE 0.031448 0.010128 3.105034 0.0023 
GROWTH -0.132018 0.019389 -6.808746 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 0.039294 0.0126 
Idiosyncratic random 0.348167 0.9874 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.229135    Mean dependent var 0.021844 





Adjusted R-squared 0.219439    S.D. dependent var 0.398816 
S.E. of regression 0.352352    Sum squared resid 19.74014 
F-statistic 23.63094    Durbin-Watson stat 2.157900 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Durbin-Watson statistic, d was applied to detect the autocorrelation in the model. From Table 
4, 𝑑 was 2.157900 with N = 162 and k = 2. At 5% level of significance, the value of lower value, 
𝑑𝐿 = 1.716 and upper value, 𝑑𝑈 = 1.767 were obtained from the DW Statistic Table. The DW 
value, d was greater than 𝑑𝑈, thus the null hypothesis which stated “no autocorrelation” is 
accepted.  The model was free from autocorrelation. The equation of the transformed model for 
ROAE was: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐸 = −0.6980 + 0.0314𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 − 0.1320𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 
 
The ROAE was positively related to market capitalisation (denoted by Size) and negatively 
related to market-to-book value (denoted by Growth). What is important to note is that it was not 
influenced by the event in 2012. When there was an increase of 1 unit of market capitalisation and 
market to book value, the ROAE was -0.80.  
To summarise, the panel regression analysis found that the event of 2012 had a positive 
influence on net profit margin and ROAA, but not ROAE. This finding contrasted with Bank of 
Indonesia’s (2013b) observation that the financial performance of public-listed non-financial 
companies were negatively impacted by the slowdown in international trade activity in the same 
year due to the Eurozone Crisis. Put simply, while public-listed non-financial companies endured 
hard times in 2012, public-listed housing development companies were enjoying the opposite. 
Indeed as shown in Table 1, the net profit margin, ROAA (and even ROAE) augmented 
appreciably for the sample companies that year. It is also noteworthy that the average increase of 
profit before tax for 2012 from the previous year was 47%.  
The panel regression analysis results begs the question: what was the event of 2012 that led 
to the excellent financial performance? But before that question is answered, the next sub-section 
probed into what event that unfolded in 2007 that led the year to being paired up with 2012. 
 
Events of 2007 
 
Before the sub-prime crisis unfolded in the second half of 2007, Indonesia enjoyed robust 
economic growth (Goh et al., 2011) The favourable performance was resultant of significant 
surplus of balance of payments reinforcing the international reserves, exchange rate stability, 
strong credit expansion and inflation that was under control. In the second half of 2007 however, 
the Indonesian economy experienced the knock-on effects of the sub-prime mortgage crisis, as 
well as price hike in oil and other international commodities thereby threatening purchasing 
power with prospect of higher production cost, among others. The high oil price prompted the 
government to execute the cut-off domestic oil subsidy, thus contributing to capital reversal by 
some foreign investors (Ismal, 2013). The combination of all these deleterious forces affected 
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assets in Indonesia and also triggered a round of capital reversal on the domestic financial market, 
with Bank Indonesia Certificate (SBI), government securities and stocks most affected. The 
portfolio outflow led to large declines in their assets credit growth (Isnawangsih et al., 2013). 
Investor confidence was affected, and as a consequence real estate growth slowed down slightly 
to 7.9% as opposed to 8.5% in 2006 (see Figure 2).  
Despite this capital flight in 2007, Indonesia actually experienced only a mild moderation 
because of the small size of the banking system and capital market (Isnawangsih et al., 2013). 
Remarkably, the economy recorded better growth in 2007 (i.e. 6.3%) compared to the previous 
year (i.e. 5.5%). The same cannot be said for the real estate sector which moved in opposite 
direction to the general economic recording 7.9% growth in 2007 as opposed to 8.5% growth the 
previous year (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage change in residential property price index (year on year) for national level and Greater Jakarta. 
Source: Bank Indonesia 
Note: The nationwide data is actually for 14 major Indonesian cities including Greater Jakarta.  
 
But the situation could have been worse for the primary housing market if not for a mixture 
of government intervention and fortuitous cirumstance (Isnawangsih et al., 2013). Bank Indonesia 
reduced its interest rate from 9.75% in December 2006 to 8.00% in December 2007 (see Figure 3), 
spurring a healthy growth in mortgage loans. Bank mortgage rates hovered around 10% per 
annum that year. Inflation rate was also fairly low at that time (see Figure 4).  






Figure 3. Rupiah interest rate spread 
Source: Bank Indonesia. 
 
 
Figure 4. Consumer price index. 
Source: Government of Indonesia. 
 
Events of 2012 
The panel regression analysis shows that the 2012 event positively eclipsed the event in 2007. As 
evident from the financial data and ratios (see Table 1), the sampled companies began to record 
healthy financial performance from 2010 onwards which peaked in 2012, which was the year the 
Eurozone Crisis erupted. This is an anomaly that requires explanation.  
The Indonesian economy was not entirely insulated from the damaging effect of the Eurozone 
Crisis which was transmitted via the trade channel (BI, 2012). Indonesia’s export slumped, 
exacerbated by the drop in prices of several commodities such as palm oil, coal and crude oil. As 
a counteracting measure, Indonesia diverted its exports to include ASEAN countries as well as 
South Korea and Taiwan. Also, trade finance shrunk due to limited expansion activities by 
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European banks as a result of deleveraging. But as Figure 1 shows, the Indonesian economy 
contracted only slightly that year, from 6.5% to 6.2%. 
Indonesia were less affected by the drop in global demand compared to other Asian 
neighbours which had strong trading links with Europe because of its strong domestic demand 
(Rana and Blomenhofer, 2013; ADB, 2013). Indeed, the Indonesian government admitted that 
solid domestic consumption propped up the national economy (BI, 2013a). This robust domestic 
demand is attributable to rising real public purchasing power and widening consumer base as 
the Indonesian middle class grew larger. Household consumption was also strong because of 
consumer confidence level was high (see Figure 5). Strong economic growth in the preceding two 
years had boosted consumer confidence. According to official statistics, household consumption 
registered a 5.3% growth in 2012, up from the previous year of 4.7%. It was this solid domestic 




Figure 5. Consumer Confidence Index 
Source: Bank Indonesia 
 
Concurrently, there was another force that acted on the Indonesian economy in a positive 
way: sound investment. While other Asian countries experienced a sharp drop of FDI inflow due 
to heavy dependence on the European Union (EU) (Rana and Blomenhofer, 2013), Indonesia on 
the other hand enjoyed increased FDI amounting to US$34.5 billion in 2012, up 42.2% from the 
previous year (BI, 2013b), most of it going to manufacturing and mining sectors (excluding oil 
and gas) (ADB, 2013). The structural reforms to improve investment climate which was 
implemented in the mid-2000s finally paid off (Isnawangsih et al, 2013).  
Solid domestic demand and healthy FDI stream boosted the local property market 
(Dermawan and Setyoningsi, 2012). Though expatriates and foreign businessmen were subjected 
to strict restrictions when it comes to house purchase, they still needed residences just as local 















































































the study period (see Figure 4) also boosted borrowing for house purchases (Dermawan and 
Setyoningsih, 2012). Also, borrowing for home purchases was never as attractive as in 2012, thus 
fueling further the housing purchase boom. Ever since April 2006 when interest rate was 12.75%, 
there has been a downward trend in interest rate to an all-time low of 5.75% (see Figure 3).   
There was another factor that drove sales of housing up, and it had to do with financial 
regulation. In 2012, Bank Indonesia implemented a raft of macro-economic tools to control 
liquidity in the economy, one of which was the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio effective 15 June 2012 as 
spelt out in Circular No 14/10/DPNP dated 15th March 2012 (OECD, 2012; BI 2012; BI, 2013b). 
Banks were given a transition period of three months for them to harmonise their Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP), disseminate information as well as to adjust their reporting system 
to Bank Indonesia. The LTV ratio was set at the maximum of 70% for residential loans of building 
types (including flats and apartments) over 70 m2. Residential loans under government 
programmes were exempted. The LTV policy was intended to safeguard the growth of residential 
loans properties above 70 m2 from potential debtors with inadequate financial capacity and 
speculative behaviour (BI, 2012).  But what actually transpired was that banks accelerated 
residential financing for such properties ahead of the deadline. There was high growth of 
residential loans for the residential type of over 70 m2 in June 2012 amounting to 32% (y-o-y) in 
contrast to 12% in June the previous year. The growth of over 70 m2 properties began to slow 
down to 43% (y-o-y) in September 2012 compared to 62% (y-o-y) in September 2011. However, it 
bounced back to 48% (y-o-y) in December 2012 compared to 27% in December 2011 in part due 
to cyclical end-of-year residential loan growth. Overall, loans in December 2012 grew by 21.7% 
from the previous year to reach IDR222.35 trillion (US$22.79 billion).  
The combination of strong domestic demand, sound FDI, low inflation, favourable interest 
rate and impending LTV regulation boosted housing demand which is reflected in the residential 
Property Price Index rising in the fourth quarter of 2012 by 7.0% (year on year) (BI, 2013c) (see 
Figure 2). Residential property sales volume in 2012 rose by 26.7%. For small houses, the increase 




The above analysis which stretched from 2004-2012 shows that the GFC of 2008 did not impinge 
on the financial performance of public listed housing development companies to the extent that 
other events did. In fact the subprime mortgage which unfolded a year before did. However 
between that 2007 event and that which took place in 2012, the latter was more significant. Again, 
investigations revealed that it was not the Eurozone Crisis that triggered significant financial 
performance of the sampled companies as one might assume. Instead it was a combination of 
domestic factors that included high consumer confidence, FDI inflow, low inflation, attractive 
interest rate and impending LTV regulation and that made 2012 such a significant year for the 
sample public listed housing developers. It is so easy to regard the GFC as the watershed for 
many national economies and their constituent sectors. What this study has underscored is that 
only proper analysis can reveal whether this generalisation holds true. In fact, it might even 
uncover unexpected results.  
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